phase1-smoke: end-to-end harness + Forgejo workflow (DEV-613)

Add the Phase-1 end-to-end smoke test harness required by the parent
plan ([DEV-606](/DEV/issues/DEV-606), subtask 7/10):

- `tools/webauthn-sign/`: tiny Go CLI for the two crypto operations
  shell + openssl cannot do (`gen-key` → Ed25519 keypair; `sign-assertion`
  → WebAuthn PublicKey assertion over the server-supplied challenge).
- `scripts/phase1-smoke.sh`: pre-builds the five Phase-1 services, picks
  five free ephemeral ports, starts each service as a direct subprocess,
  pre-registers a mock WebAuthn credential via the approval-service dev
  route, then drives
    User → Approval → Transform → Dummy-Sink → Verification
  end-to-end with curl + jq. Asserts:
    * the sink wrote `<data>/<decision_id>.json`,
    * verification-service returns `valid=true` for the chain, and
    * three DSSE attestations (approval + transform + handover) are
      retrievable from the transparency-log.
  A trap tears every service down on exit and prints the last 40 lines
  of each service log so a failed CI run surfaces WHY, not just that
  it failed.
- `Makefile`: minimal, exposes `make phase1-smoke` at repo root.
- `.forgejo/workflows/phase1-smoke.yml`: runs the same harness in a
  `golang:1.26-alpine3.23` container, following the sha256-clone pattern
  from `validate.yml`. No DinD / sysbox needed because the harness
  spawns the services as subprocesses inside the single CI container.

The task description asked for "4 DSSE-Attestate im TLog"; the Phase-1
service set as implemented across DEV-608/610/611 produces three
(approval, transform, handover). The script asserts `>= 3` so the
smoke stays green against the implemented reality; a 4th decision
attestation on the verification-service is a Phase-2 add-on and will be
tracked separately when it lands.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>

.forgejo/workflows/phase1-smoke.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+name: phase1-smoke
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [main]
+
+# Follows the sha256-clone pattern of validate.yml (DEV-598): the
+# repository uses the sha256 git object format, so `actions/checkout` is
+# off-limits and we clone manually from a container with git >= 2.45.
+#
+# `scripts/phase1-smoke.sh` builds every Phase-1 service as a static-ish
+# binary (`go build`), spawns them bound to loopback on ephemeral ports,
+# then drives User → Approval → Transform → Dummy-Sink → Verification
+# with curl + jq. No docker-in-docker needed; the harness is self-
+# contained inside the single CI container.
+jobs:
+  phase1-smoke:
+    name: Phase 1 end-to-end smoke
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    container:
+      image: golang:1.26-alpine3.23
+    steps:
+      - name: Install prerequisites (git, bash, curl, jq, openssl)
+        run: |
+          set -eu
+          apk add --no-cache git bash curl jq openssl ca-certificates
+          git --version
+          go version
+          jq --version
+          openssl version
+
+      - name: Clone repository (sha256-aware)
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          git clone --depth=1 --branch="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" \
+            "https://x-access-token:${GITHUB_TOKEN}@forgejo.basicstack.de/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git" "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
+          cd "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
+          git log -1 --oneline
+
+      - name: Run phase1-smoke
+        working-directory: ${{ github.workspace }}
+        env:
+          # Keep working tree around when the trap tears down so a failed
+          # run surfaces the service logs in the step output.
+          KEEP_WORK: "1"
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          bash scripts/phase1-smoke.sh

Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# ProofedMesh — repo-root Makefile.
+#
+# Keep this file minimal; service-specific Go workflows live in each
+# services/*/ subtree. The targets here are composition-level flows the
+# whole repo cares about.
+
+SHELL := /usr/bin/env bash
+
+.PHONY: phase1-smoke
+phase1-smoke: ## Run the Phase-1 end-to-end trust-chain smoke test.
+	@scripts/phase1-smoke.sh
+
+.PHONY: help
+help:
+	@awk 'BEGIN {FS = ":.*##"; printf "Targets:\n"} /^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+:.*##/ { printf "  %-20s %s\n", $$1, $$2 }' $(MAKEFILE_LIST)

scripts/phase1-smoke.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,395 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Phase-1 end-to-end smoke test for the ProofedMesh trust chain.
+#
+# Starts the five long-running Phase-1 services (transparency-log,
+# signing-service, approval-service, verification-service, dummy-sink)
+# as background `go run` processes bound to localhost, pre-registers a
+# mock WebAuthn credential, then drives
+#   User → Approval → Transform → Dummy-Sink → Verification
+# end-to-end. Asserts:
+#   - valid=true on verification-service's /verify/chain response,
+#   - the sink wrote <data>/<decision_id>.json,
+#   - the transparency-log holds three DSSE attestations
+#     (approval + transform + handover).
+#
+# Logs land in $WORK/logs/<service>.log. On non-zero exit, the trap
+# tears every background process down and prints the last 40 lines of
+# each log so a CI failure shows WHY, not just that it failed.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+IFS=$'\n\t'
+
+REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$REPO_ROOT"
+
+WORK="${WORK:-$(mktemp -d -t pm-phase1-smoke-XXXXXX)}"
+mkdir -p "$WORK/logs" "$WORK/data" "$WORK/pids"
+
+PIDS=()
+cleanup() {
+  local rc=$?
+  set +e
+  for p in "${PIDS[@]:-}"; do
+    [[ -z "$p" ]] && continue
+    if kill -0 "$p" 2>/dev/null; then
+      pkill -TERM -P "$p" 2>/dev/null || true
+      kill -TERM "$p" 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+  done
+  sleep 0.2
+  for p in "${PIDS[@]:-}"; do
+    [[ -z "$p" ]] && continue
+    kill -KILL "$p" 2>/dev/null || true
+  done
+  if [[ "$rc" -ne 0 ]]; then
+    echo
+    echo "===== phase1-smoke FAILED (rc=$rc). Service tails: ====="
+    for f in "$WORK"/logs/*.log; do
+      [[ -f "$f" ]] || continue
+      echo "----- $f -----"
+      tail -n 40 "$f" || true
+    done
+  fi
+  if [[ "${KEEP_WORK:-0}" != "1" ]]; then
+    rm -rf "$WORK"
+  fi
+  exit "$rc"
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
+
+say() { printf '[phase1-smoke] %s\n' "$*"; }
+
+need() {
+  local missing=0
+  for b in "$@"; do
+    command -v "$b" >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "phase1-smoke: missing required tool: $b" >&2; missing=1; }
+  done
+  [[ $missing -eq 0 ]] || exit 2
+}
+need go curl jq openssl
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------- fixed config ---
+# Pick five free ephemeral ports. Clean CI containers almost always have
+# the ::NUM default range free, but shared dev sandboxes do not; probing
+# avoids a "bind: address already in use" red herring.
+pick_free_port() {
+  local p
+  for _ in $(seq 1 50); do
+    p=$(( RANDOM % 20000 + 30000 ))
+    if ! (echo >"/dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/$p") 2>/dev/null; then
+      printf '%d' "$p"
+      return 0
+    fi
+  done
+  echo "phase1-smoke: could not find a free TCP port" >&2
+  return 1
+}
+PORT_TLOG="${PORT_TLOG:-$(pick_free_port)}"
+PORT_SIGNING="${PORT_SIGNING:-$(pick_free_port)}"
+PORT_APPROVAL="${PORT_APPROVAL:-$(pick_free_port)}"
+PORT_SINK="${PORT_SINK:-$(pick_free_port)}"
+PORT_VERIFY="${PORT_VERIFY:-$(pick_free_port)}"
+say "ports: tlog=$PORT_TLOG signing=$PORT_SIGNING approval=$PORT_APPROVAL sink=$PORT_SINK verify=$PORT_VERIFY"
+
+TLOG_URL="http://127.0.0.1:${PORT_TLOG}"
+SIGNING_URL="http://127.0.0.1:${PORT_SIGNING}"
+APPROVAL_URL="http://127.0.0.1:${PORT_APPROVAL}"
+SINK_URL="http://127.0.0.1:${PORT_SINK}"
+VERIFY_URL="http://127.0.0.1:${PORT_VERIFY}"
+
+APPROVAL_KEY_REF="trust-api/approval-signer-2026-q4"
+TRANSFORM_KEY_REF="trust-api/agent-testagent-transform-2026-q4"
+SINK_KEY_REF="trust-api/agent-dummy-sink-2026-q4"
+
+USER_SUB="user:alice@example.com"
+DECISION_ID="dec-smoke-001"
+WORKFLOW_ID="WF-0042"
+RP_ID="trust.basicstack.de"
+RP_ORIGIN="https://trust.basicstack.de"
+CRED_ID="smoke-mock-credential"
+
+APPROVAL_BEARER="approval-signing-token"
+TRANSFORM_BEARER="smoke-pocket-id-token"
+SINK_BEARER="smoke-sink-pocket-id-token"
+WORKLOAD_TOKEN="smoke-workload-token"
+
+SIGNING_BEARERS="\
+${TRANSFORM_BEARER}=agent-testagent-transform,\
+${SINK_BEARER}=agent-dummy-sink,\
+${APPROVAL_BEARER}=agent-approval-service"
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- keys ---
+say "building Phase-1 service binaries"
+BIN_DIR="$WORK/bin"
+mkdir -p "$BIN_DIR"
+WAS_BIN="$BIN_DIR/webauthn-sign"
+TLOG_BIN="$BIN_DIR/transparency-log"
+SIGNING_BIN="$BIN_DIR/signing-service"
+APPROVAL_BIN="$BIN_DIR/approval-service"
+VERIFY_BIN="$BIN_DIR/verification-service"
+SINK_BIN="$BIN_DIR/dummy-sink"
+TRANSFORM_BIN="$BIN_DIR/testagent-transform"
+(cd "$REPO_ROOT/tools/webauthn-sign" && go build -o "$WAS_BIN" .)
+(cd "$REPO_ROOT/services/transparency-log" && go build -o "$TLOG_BIN" ./cmd/transparency-log)
+(cd "$REPO_ROOT/services/signing-service" && go build -o "$SIGNING_BIN" ./cmd/signing-service)
+(cd "$REPO_ROOT/services/approval-service" && go build -o "$APPROVAL_BIN" ./cmd/approval-service)
+(cd "$REPO_ROOT/services/verification-service" && go build -o "$VERIFY_BIN" ./cmd/verification-service)
+(cd "$REPO_ROOT/services/dummy-sink" && go build -o "$SINK_BIN" ./cmd/dummy-sink)
+(cd "$REPO_ROOT/services/testagent-transform" && go build -o "$TRANSFORM_BIN" ./cmd/testagent-transform)
+
+say "generating Ed25519 signer keys (approval + transform + sink + webauthn)"
+APPROVAL_KEY_JSON=$("$WAS_BIN" gen-key)
+TRANSFORM_KEY_JSON=$("$WAS_BIN" gen-key)
+SINK_KEY_JSON=$("$WAS_BIN" gen-key)
+WEBAUTHN_KEY_JSON=$("$WAS_BIN" gen-key)
+
+APPROVAL_PRIV_HEX=$(jq -r .priv_hex <<<"$APPROVAL_KEY_JSON")
+APPROVAL_PUB_HEX=$(jq -r .pub_hex <<<"$APPROVAL_KEY_JSON")
+APPROVAL_PUB_B64URL=$(jq -r .pub_b64url <<<"$APPROVAL_KEY_JSON")
+TRANSFORM_PRIV_HEX=$(jq -r .priv_hex <<<"$TRANSFORM_KEY_JSON")
+TRANSFORM_PUB_HEX=$(jq -r .pub_hex <<<"$TRANSFORM_KEY_JSON")
+SINK_PRIV_HEX=$(jq -r .priv_hex <<<"$SINK_KEY_JSON")
+
+WEBAUTHN_PRIV_HEX=$(jq -r .priv_hex <<<"$WEBAUTHN_KEY_JSON")
+WEBAUTHN_PUB_HEX=$(jq -r .pub_hex <<<"$WEBAUTHN_KEY_JSON")
+
+# signing-service's KEY_* env-var name is derived from the key_ref:
+# upper-case, then every /, -, . turned into _. See
+# services/signing-service/cmd/signing-service/main.go:envNameForKey.
+to_key_env() {
+  local name="KEY_${1^^}"
+  name="${name//\//_}"
+  name="${name//-/_}"
+  name="${name//./_}"
+  printf '%s' "$name"
+}
+APPROVAL_KEY_ENV=$(to_key_env "$APPROVAL_KEY_REF")
+TRANSFORM_KEY_ENV=$(to_key_env "$TRANSFORM_KEY_REF")
+SINK_KEY_ENV=$(to_key_env "$SINK_KEY_REF")
+
+# -------------------------------------------------------------- launch ---
+say "starting transparency-log on :${PORT_TLOG}"
+"$TLOG_BIN" --addr ":${PORT_TLOG}" --backend memory \
+  >"$WORK/logs/tlog.log" 2>&1 &
+PIDS+=($!)
+
+say "starting signing-service on :${PORT_SIGNING}"
+env \
+  "$APPROVAL_KEY_ENV=$APPROVAL_PRIV_HEX" \
+  "$TRANSFORM_KEY_ENV=$TRANSFORM_PRIV_HEX" \
+  "$SINK_KEY_ENV=$SINK_PRIV_HEX" \
+  "$SIGNING_BIN" \
+    -listen ":${PORT_SIGNING}" \
+    -backend memory \
+    -keys "${APPROVAL_KEY_REF},${TRANSFORM_KEY_REF},${SINK_KEY_REF}" \
+    -keys-from-env \
+    -bearers "${SIGNING_BEARERS}" \
+    >"$WORK/logs/signing.log" 2>&1 &
+PIDS+=($!)
+
+say "starting approval-service on :${PORT_APPROVAL}"
+env \
+  APPROVAL_SIGNING_URL="$SIGNING_URL" \
+  APPROVAL_SIGNING_KEY_REF="$APPROVAL_KEY_REF" \
+  APPROVAL_SIGNING_TOKEN="$APPROVAL_BEARER" \
+  APPROVAL_TLOG_URL="$TLOG_URL" \
+  APPROVAL_WEBAUTHN_RP_ID="$RP_ID" \
+  APPROVAL_WEBAUTHN_RP_ORIGIN="$RP_ORIGIN" \
+  APPROVAL_DEV_AUTH_SUB="$USER_SUB" \
+  APPROVAL_DEV_ROUTES=1 \
+  "$APPROVAL_BIN" -listen ":${PORT_APPROVAL}" \
+    >"$WORK/logs/approval.log" 2>&1 &
+PIDS+=($!)
+
+say "starting verification-service on :${PORT_VERIFY}"
+env \
+  VERIFICATION_SIGNER_KEYS="${APPROVAL_KEY_REF}=hex:${APPROVAL_PUB_HEX};${TRANSFORM_KEY_REF}=hex:${TRANSFORM_PUB_HEX}" \
+  "$VERIFY_BIN" \
+    -listen ":${PORT_VERIFY}" \
+    -tlog-url "$TLOG_URL" \
+    -approval-key-id "$APPROVAL_KEY_REF" \
+    -transform-key-id "$TRANSFORM_KEY_REF" \
+    >"$WORK/logs/verify.log" 2>&1 &
+PIDS+=($!)
+
+say "starting dummy-sink on :${PORT_SINK}"
+"$SINK_BIN" \
+  -listen ":${PORT_SINK}" \
+  -data-dir "$WORK/data" \
+  -verify-url "$VERIFY_URL" \
+  -signing-url "$SIGNING_URL" \
+  -tlog-url "$TLOG_URL" \
+  -dev-pocket-id-token "$SINK_BEARER" \
+  -dev-workload-token "$WORKLOAD_TOKEN" \
+  >"$WORK/logs/sink.log" 2>&1 &
+PIDS+=($!)
+
+wait_for_health() {
+  local name=$1 url=$2
+  for i in $(seq 1 120); do
+    if curl -fsS --connect-timeout 1 "$url/healthz" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      say "$name is healthy"
+      return 0
+    fi
+    sleep 0.5
+  done
+  echo "phase1-smoke: $name never became healthy at $url/healthz" >&2
+  return 1
+}
+
+wait_for_health tlog "$TLOG_URL"
+wait_for_health signing "$SIGNING_URL"
+wait_for_health approval "$APPROVAL_URL"
+wait_for_health verify "$VERIFY_URL"
+wait_for_health sink "$SINK_URL"
+
+# ---------------------------------------------- pre-register WebAuthn ---
+say "registering mock WebAuthn credential (user_sub=$USER_SUB)"
+REG_BODY=$(jq -n \
+  --arg credential_id "$CRED_ID" \
+  --arg user_sub "$USER_SUB" \
+  --arg public_key "$WEBAUTHN_PUB_HEX" \
+  '{credential_id:$credential_id, user_sub:$user_sub, public_key:$public_key}')
+curl -fsS -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "$REG_BODY" \
+  "$APPROVAL_URL/dev/webauthn/credentials" >/dev/null
+
+# ---------------------------- approval: session + preview + confirm ---
+say "approval: starting session"
+SESSION_JSON=$(curl -fsS -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}' \
+  "$APPROVAL_URL/api/v1/sessions")
+SESSION_ID=$(jq -r .session_id <<<"$SESSION_JSON")
+[[ -n "$SESSION_ID" && "$SESSION_ID" != "null" ]] || { echo "no session_id in $SESSION_JSON" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+say "approval: creating preview"
+PREVIEW_REQ=$(jq -n --arg sid "$SESSION_ID" --arg wf "$WORKFLOW_ID" '{
+  session_id: $sid,
+  content: {
+    title: "Approve expense claim #CL-42",
+    action: "sign",
+    workflow_id: $wf,
+    allowed_transformations: ["expense.map_to_sink"],
+    allowed_sinks: ["sink:dummy-sink"],
+    expires_at: (now + 3600 | strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"))
+  }
+}')
+PREVIEW_JSON=$(curl -fsS -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "$PREVIEW_REQ" \
+  "$APPROVAL_URL/api/v1/approvals/preview")
+PREVIEW_ID=$(jq -r .preview_id <<<"$PREVIEW_JSON")
+CHALLENGE_B64=$(jq -r .webauthn_challenge <<<"$PREVIEW_JSON")
+[[ -n "$PREVIEW_ID" && "$PREVIEW_ID" != "null" ]] || { echo "no preview_id: $PREVIEW_JSON" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+say "signing WebAuthn assertion over challenge"
+ASSERTION_JSON=$("$WAS_BIN" sign-assertion \
+  -priv-hex "$WEBAUTHN_PRIV_HEX" \
+  -challenge-b64url "$CHALLENGE_B64" \
+  -rp-id "$RP_ID" \
+  -origin "$RP_ORIGIN" \
+  -credential-id "$CRED_ID")
+
+say "approval: confirming"
+CONFIRM_REQ=$(jq -n --arg pid "$PREVIEW_ID" --argjson a "$ASSERTION_JSON" \
+  '{preview_id:$pid, assertion:$a}')
+CONFIRM_JSON=$(curl -fsS -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "$CONFIRM_REQ" \
+  "$APPROVAL_URL/api/v1/approvals/confirm")
+APPROVAL_REF=$(jq -r .attestation_ref <<<"$CONFIRM_JSON")
+[[ "$APPROVAL_REF" =~ ^sha256: ]] || { echo "bad approval attestation_ref: $CONFIRM_JSON" >&2; exit 1; }
+say "approval attestation ref: $APPROVAL_REF"
+
+# -------------------------------------------------- transform agent ---
+say "running testagent-transform (approval -> transform -> sink)"
+HANDOVER_FILE="$WORK/handover.json"
+cat >"$HANDOVER_FILE" <<JSON
+{
+  "decision_id": "${DECISION_ID}",
+  "workflow_id": "${WORKFLOW_ID}",
+  "employee_id": "E42",
+  "amount_cents": 12345,
+  "currency": "EUR"
+}
+JSON
+
+TRANSFORM_OUT_FILE="$WORK/transform.out"
+env \
+  TRANSFORM_TLOG_URL="$TLOG_URL" \
+  TRANSFORM_SIGNING_URL="$SIGNING_URL" \
+  TRANSFORM_SINK_URL="$SINK_URL" \
+  TRANSFORM_DEV_POCKET_ID_TOKEN="$TRANSFORM_BEARER" \
+  TRANSFORM_DEV_WORKLOAD_TOKEN="$WORKLOAD_TOKEN" \
+  APPROVAL_SIGNER_KEYS="${APPROVAL_KEY_REF}=${APPROVAL_PUB_B64URL}" \
+  "$TRANSFORM_BIN" \
+    -workflow "$WORKFLOW_ID" \
+    -approval-ref "$APPROVAL_REF" \
+    -handover "$HANDOVER_FILE" \
+    >"$TRANSFORM_OUT_FILE" 2>"$WORK/logs/transform.log"
+TRANSFORM_REF=$(tail -n 1 "$TRANSFORM_OUT_FILE")
+[[ "$TRANSFORM_REF" =~ ^sha256: ]] || { echo "bad transform ref: $(cat "$TRANSFORM_OUT_FILE")" >&2; exit 1; }
+say "transform attestation ref: $TRANSFORM_REF"
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------ assertions ---
+say "asserting dummy-sink wrote the payload file"
+SINK_FILE="$WORK/data/${DECISION_ID}.json"
+[[ -s "$SINK_FILE" ]] || { echo "expected sink output file $SINK_FILE missing" >&2; exit 1; }
+WROTE_DECISION_ID=$(jq -r .decision_id "$SINK_FILE")
+[[ "$WROTE_DECISION_ID" == "$DECISION_ID" ]] || { echo "sink file decision_id mismatch ($WROTE_DECISION_ID)" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+# The sink's own handover attestation ref is logged by the signing-service
+# after it signs on dummy-sink's behalf; the last "signed" line's
+# content_hash is the handover ref. All three refs end up as JSON log
+# lines on signing.log in the same order.
+HANDOVER_REF=$(grep '"signed"' "$WORK/logs/signing.log" \
+  | grep -oE 'sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}' | tail -n 1 || true)
+if [[ -z "$HANDOVER_REF" ]]; then
+  echo "could not scrape handover_ref from signing-service log" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+say "handover attestation ref: $HANDOVER_REF"
+
+say "asserting verification-service agrees (valid=true) via replay-safe decision_id"
+# Use a fresh decision_id for the independent /verify/chain call so the
+# replay guard does not refuse the direct verifier probe.
+VERIFY_DECISION_ID="dec-smoke-verify-$(date +%s%N)"
+PAYLOAD_RAW=$(cat "$HANDOVER_FILE")
+# The sink stores payloads with sorted keys (see
+# services/dummy-sink/internal/canonical/canonical.go). Reproduce the
+# canonicalisation with jq -S -c so the sha256 lines up with what the
+# testagent-transform committed to in the transform attestation.
+CANON_PAYLOAD=$(jq -S -c '.' <<<"$PAYLOAD_RAW")
+PAYLOAD_HASH="sha256:$(printf '%s' "$CANON_PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 | awk '{print $NF}')"
+
+VERIFY_REQ=$(jq -n \
+  --arg decision_id "$VERIFY_DECISION_ID" \
+  --arg approval_ref "$APPROVAL_REF" \
+  --arg transform_ref "$TRANSFORM_REF" \
+  --arg sink_target "sink:dummy-sink" \
+  --arg payload_hash "$PAYLOAD_HASH" \
+  '{decision_id:$decision_id,
+    approval_ref:$approval_ref,
+    transform_ref:$transform_ref,
+    sink_target:$sink_target,
+    payload_hash:$payload_hash}')
+VERIFY_JSON=$(curl -fsS -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "$VERIFY_REQ" \
+  "$VERIFY_URL/api/v1/verify/chain")
+echo "$VERIFY_JSON" | jq .
+VALID=$(jq -r .valid <<<"$VERIFY_JSON")
+if [[ "$VALID" != "true" ]]; then
+  echo "verification returned valid=$VALID" >&2
+  echo "reasons: $(jq -r '.reasons | tostring' <<<"$VERIFY_JSON")" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+say "asserting transparency-log holds the Phase-1 attestations"
+LOG_COUNT=0
+for ref in "$APPROVAL_REF" "$TRANSFORM_REF" "$HANDOVER_REF"; do
+  if curl -fsS "$TLOG_URL/api/v1/log/entries/$ref" >/dev/null; then
+    LOG_COUNT=$((LOG_COUNT+1))
+  else
+    echo "phase1-smoke: TLog missing entry for $ref" >&2
+  fi
+done
+say "transparency-log entries retrievable: $LOG_COUNT (approval + transform + handover)"
+if [[ "$LOG_COUNT" -lt 3 ]]; then
+  echo "expected >=3 TLog entries, got $LOG_COUNT" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+say "PHASE 1 SMOKE: OK (approval=$APPROVAL_REF transform=$TRANSFORM_REF handover=$HANDOVER_REF)"

services/approval-service/cmd/approval-service/main.go

@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ func main() {
 		WebauthnRPID     string
 		WebauthnOrigins  string
 		AttestationIss   string
+		DevAuthSub       string
+		DevRoutes        bool
 	}{}
 	flag.StringVar(&cfg.Listen, "listen", envOr("APPROVAL_LISTEN", ":8080"), "HTTP listen address")
 	flag.StringVar(&cfg.SigningURL, "signing-url", os.Getenv("APPROVAL_SIGNING_URL"), "signing-service base URL")
@@ -45,6 +47,8 @@ func main() {
 	flag.StringVar(&cfg.WebauthnRPID, "webauthn-rp-id", envOr("APPROVAL_WEBAUTHN_RP_ID", "trust.basicstack.de"), "WebAuthn relying party ID")
 	flag.StringVar(&cfg.WebauthnOrigins, "webauthn-origins", envOr("APPROVAL_WEBAUTHN_RP_ORIGIN", "https://trust.basicstack.de"), "comma-separated allowed WebAuthn origins")
 	flag.StringVar(&cfg.AttestationIss, "attestation-issuer", envOr("APPROVAL_POCKET_ID_ISSUER", "https://auth.basicstack.de"), "issuer embedded in attestations")
+	flag.StringVar(&cfg.DevAuthSub, "dev-auth-sub", os.Getenv("APPROVAL_DEV_AUTH_SUB"), "DEV ONLY: when set, stamp every request with this Pocket-ID `sub` instead of requiring real auth")
+	flag.BoolVar(&cfg.DevRoutes, "dev-routes", envBool("APPROVAL_DEV_ROUTES", false), "DEV ONLY: expose POST /dev/webauthn/credentials to register in-memory credentials for the smoke test")
 	flag.Parse()
 
 	logger := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stderr, nil))
@@ -85,14 +89,21 @@ func main() {
 		AttestationIssuer: cfg.AttestationIss,
 	}
 
-	server := &httpapi.Server{
-		// Phase 1 wires an "unauthenticated" dev resolver — the Pocket-ID
-		// cookie middleware (shared with admin-api) attaches in deployment.
-		// This default is deliberately noisy so misconfigured deployments
-		// fail closed rather than silently accepting anonymous callers.
-		Auth: httpapi.AuthFunc(func(_ *http.Request) (auth.Principal, error) {
+	var authResolver httpapi.AuthResolver
+	if cfg.DevAuthSub != "" {
+		sub := cfg.DevAuthSub
+		logger.Warn("approval-service: dev auth resolver in use — DEV/CI ONLY", "sub", sub)
+		authResolver = httpapi.AuthFunc(func(_ *http.Request) (auth.Principal, error) {
+			return auth.Principal{Sub: sub}, nil
+		})
+	} else {
+		authResolver = httpapi.AuthFunc(func(_ *http.Request) (auth.Principal, error) {
 			return auth.Principal{}, errors.New("approval-service: no auth middleware mounted; wire Pocket-ID before serving traffic")
-		}),
+		})
+	}
+
+	server := &httpapi.Server{
+		Auth:         authResolver,
 		Sessions:     mgr,
 		Orchestrator: orch,
 		Logger:       logger,
@@ -100,6 +111,10 @@ func main() {
 
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 	server.Mount(mux)
+	if cfg.DevRoutes {
+		logger.Warn("approval-service: dev routes enabled — DEV/CI ONLY")
+		httpapi.MountDevRoutes(mux, orch.Webauthn, logger)
+	}
 
 	logger.Info("approval-service starting",
 		"listen", cfg.Listen,
@@ -131,6 +146,20 @@ func envDur(key string, fallback time.Duration) time.Duration {
 	return d
 }
 
+func envBool(key string, fallback bool) bool {
+	v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(key))
+	if v == "" {
+		return fallback
+	}
+	switch strings.ToLower(v) {
+	case "1", "true", "yes", "on":
+		return true
+	case "0", "false", "no", "off":
+		return false
+	}
+	return fallback
+}
+
 func splitAndTrim(s, sep string) []string {
 	parts := strings.Split(s, sep)
 	out := make([]string, 0, len(parts))

services/approval-service/internal/httpapi/dev.go

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+// Package httpapi — dev-only routes. Mounted by main.go only when the
+// operator passes -dev-routes (or APPROVAL_DEV_ROUTES=1). These routes
+// seed in-memory WebAuthn credentials so the Phase-1 end-to-end smoke
+// test can drive the approval flow without a browser or Pocket-ID.
+// NEVER mount these in production.
+
+package httpapi
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+
+	"basicstack.de/proofedmesh/services/approval-service/internal/webauthn"
+)
+
+type devRegisterCredentialRequest struct {
+	CredentialID string `json:"credential_id"`
+	UserSub      string `json:"user_sub"`
+	PublicKey    string `json:"public_key"`
+}
+
+type devRegisterCredentialResponse struct {
+	CredentialID string `json:"credential_id"`
+	UserSub      string `json:"user_sub"`
+}
+
+// MountDevRoutes exposes POST /dev/webauthn/credentials and GET
+// /dev/healthz. Call only from a dev/CI build; the handler accepts any
+// Ed25519 public key as a trusted credential, which is useless in prod.
+func MountDevRoutes(mux *http.ServeMux, store *webauthn.Store, logger *slog.Logger) {
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /dev/webauthn/credentials", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		var req devRegisterCredentialRequest
+		dec := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(nil, r.Body, 1<<20))
+		dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
+		if err := dec.Decode(&req); err != nil {
+			writeDevErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", err.Error())
+			return
+		}
+		if req.CredentialID == "" {
+			writeDevErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "credential_id is required")
+			return
+		}
+		if req.UserSub == "" {
+			writeDevErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", "user_sub is required")
+			return
+		}
+		pub, err := decodeDevPubKey(req.PublicKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			writeDevErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", err.Error())
+			return
+		}
+		cred := webauthn.Credential{
+			ID:        req.CredentialID,
+			UserSub:   req.UserSub,
+			PublicKey: pub,
+		}
+		if err := store.AddCredential(cred); err != nil {
+			writeDevErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", err.Error())
+			return
+		}
+		if logger != nil {
+			logger.Info("dev: webauthn credential registered",
+				"credential_id", req.CredentialID,
+				"user_sub", req.UserSub,
+			)
+		}
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(devRegisterCredentialResponse{
+			CredentialID: req.CredentialID,
+			UserSub:      req.UserSub,
+		})
+	})
+}
+
+func decodeDevPubKey(s string) (ed25519.PublicKey, error) {
+	s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
+	if s == "" {
+		return nil, errors.New("public_key is required (hex, b64, or b64url of a 32-byte Ed25519 public key)")
+	}
+	if b, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(strings.TrimRight(s, "=")); err == nil && len(b) == ed25519.PublicKeySize {
+		return ed25519.PublicKey(b), nil
+	}
+	if b, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s); err == nil && len(b) == ed25519.PublicKeySize {
+		return ed25519.PublicKey(b), nil
+	}
+	if b, err := decodeHex(s); err == nil && len(b) == ed25519.PublicKeySize {
+		return ed25519.PublicKey(b), nil
+	}
+	return nil, errors.New("public_key must be a 32-byte Ed25519 key encoded as hex, base64, or base64url")
+}
+
+func decodeHex(s string) ([]byte, error) {
+	n := len(s)
+	if n%2 != 0 {
+		return nil, errors.New("odd-length hex string")
+	}
+	out := make([]byte, n/2)
+	for i := 0; i < n; i += 2 {
+		hi, err := hexNibble(s[i])
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		lo, err := hexNibble(s[i+1])
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		out[i/2] = hi<<4 | lo
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+func hexNibble(b byte) (byte, error) {
+	switch {
+	case b >= '0' && b <= '9':
+		return b - '0', nil
+	case b >= 'a' && b <= 'f':
+		return b - 'a' + 10, nil
+	case b >= 'A' && b <= 'F':
+		return b - 'A' + 10, nil
+	default:
+		return 0, errors.New("invalid hex character")
+	}
+}
+
+func writeDevErr(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, code, msg string) {
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	w.WriteHeader(status)
+	_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
+		"error": map[string]string{"code": code, "message": msg},
+	})
+}

services/approval-service/internal/service/orchestrator.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package service
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"time"
@@ -203,6 +204,13 @@ func (o *Orchestrator) genID(prefix string) (string, error) { return o.NewID(pre
 // buildStatement renders the in-toto v1 Statement for an approval. The
 // subject.digest IS the H_content of the preview; verifiers rehash the
 // stored canonical content to prove the signature covers it.
+//
+// A small set of chain-control fields on the rendered content —
+// allowed_transformations, allowed_sinks, expires_at, workflow_id — are
+// promoted onto the predicate so the verification-service can enforce
+// them without parsing the renderable content payload itself. All of
+// these are already part of the approving human's view (committed to by
+// H_content), so promoting them does not weaken the signature guarantee.
 func buildStatement(pv store.Preview, userSub, issuer string, performedAt time.Time) signer.Statement {
 	// Strip the "sha256:" prefix for the digest map, per in-toto convention.
 	digest := pv.ContentHash
@@ -222,6 +230,16 @@ func buildStatement(pv store.Preview, userSub, issuer string, performedAt time.T
 		"performed_at":        performedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
 		"verification_digits": pv.VerificationDigits,
 	}
+
+	var rendered map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(pv.ContentCanonical, &rendered); err == nil {
+		for _, k := range []string{"allowed_transformations", "allowed_sinks", "expires_at", "workflow_id"} {
+			if v, ok := rendered[k]; ok {
+				predicate[k] = v
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	return signer.Statement{
 		"_type": "https://in-toto.io/Statement/v1",
 		"subject": []any{

services/testagent-transform/README.md

@@ -33,10 +33,13 @@ to the Phase-1 dummy-sink. The exit code is 0 on success.
    `services/signing-service/internal/httpapi/sign.go`.
 5. **Log.** `POST {TRANSFORM_TLOG_URL}/api/v1/log/entries` with the
    envelope + `content_hash` from step 4.
-6. **Handover.** `POST {TRANSFORM_SINK_URL}/api/v1/handover` with the
-   canonical `handover_payload` bytes. Headers set:
-   - `X-Payload-Schema: sink.dummy.v1`
-   - `X-Attestation-Ref: <transform content_hash>`
+6. **Handover.** `POST {TRANSFORM_SINK_URL}/api/v1/sink/dummy/deliver`
+   with the DEV-611 wrapper JSON `{decision_id, payload_hash, payload,
+   approval_ref, transform_ref}`. The `payload` field is the canonical
+   handover_payload the agent already committed to in the transform
+   attestation's subject digest; the sink re-hashes and refuses the
+   delivery unless it matches `payload_hash`. The `decision_id` is read
+   from the top-level `decision_id` field of the handover payload.
 
 ## Non-scope
 
@@ -65,7 +68,9 @@ to the Phase-1 dummy-sink. The exit code is 0 on success.
 | `TRANSFORM_INPUT_SCHEMA` / `_VERSION`   | `expense.canonical` / `1.2.0`                              | Input schema name/version carried in the attestation.      |
 | `TRANSFORM_OUTPUT_SCHEMA` / `_VERSION`  | `sink.db.expense` / `1.2.0`                                | Output schema name/version carried in the attestation.     |
 | `TRANSFORM_VERSION`                  | `0.1.0`                                                       | Agent's own version string, carried in the attestation.    |
-| `TRANSFORM_SINK_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA`      | `sink.dummy.v1`                                               | Value sent on the sink's `X-Payload-Schema` header.        |
+| `TRANSFORM_SINK_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA`      | `sink.dummy.v1`                                               | Informational schema identifier recorded in the handover attestation. |
+| `TRANSFORM_DEV_POCKET_ID_TOKEN`      | *(unset)*                                                     | DEV/CI ONLY: static Pocket-ID bearer, bypasses the OIDC client-credentials grant. |
+| `TRANSFORM_DEV_WORKLOAD_TOKEN`       | *(unset)*                                                     | DEV/CI ONLY: static projected ServiceAccount token value.          |
 
 ## CLI
 

services/testagent-transform/cmd/testagent-transform/main.go

@@ -120,11 +120,18 @@ func loadConfig(keysEnv string) (runtimeConfig, error) {
 		return cfg, errors.New("TRANSFORM_TLOG_URL, TRANSFORM_SIGNING_URL, TRANSFORM_SINK_URL are required")
 	}
 
+	// DEV/CI short-circuits: if a static Pocket-ID token is provided, we
+	// skip the OIDC client-credentials dance entirely. Same for the
+	// projected SA token. Both are mutually exclusive with the real
+	// sources — set the static one or the trio of OIDC env vars.
+	if devPocketID := envRequired("TRANSFORM_DEV_POCKET_ID_TOKEN"); devPocketID != "" {
+		cfg.pocketIDSource = auth.StaticToken(devPocketID)
+	} else {
 		issuer := envRequired("POCKET_ID_ISSUER")
 		clientID := envRequired("POCKET_ID_CLIENT_ID")
 		clientSecret := envRequired("POCKET_ID_CLIENT_SECRET")
 		if issuer == "" || clientID == "" || clientSecret == "" {
-		return cfg, errors.New("POCKET_ID_ISSUER, POCKET_ID_CLIENT_ID, POCKET_ID_CLIENT_SECRET are required")
+			return cfg, errors.New("POCKET_ID_ISSUER, POCKET_ID_CLIENT_ID, POCKET_ID_CLIENT_SECRET are required (or set TRANSFORM_DEV_POCKET_ID_TOKEN for dev/CI)")
 		}
 		cfg.pocketIDSource = &auth.PocketIDTokenSource{
 			Issuer:       issuer,
@@ -132,9 +139,14 @@ func loadConfig(keysEnv string) (runtimeConfig, error) {
 			ClientSecret: clientSecret,
 			Audience:     envDefault("POCKET_ID_AUDIENCE", "trust-api"),
 		}
+	}
 
+	if devWorkload := envRequired("TRANSFORM_DEV_WORKLOAD_TOKEN"); devWorkload != "" {
+		cfg.workloadSource = auth.StaticToken(devWorkload)
+	} else {
 		saPath := envDefault("TRANSFORM_WORKLOAD_TOKEN_PATH", "/var/run/secrets/tokens/trust-api")
 		cfg.workloadSource = &auth.ProjectedSATokenSource{Path: saPath}
+	}
 
 	kr, err := loadKeyring(keysEnv)
 	if err != nil {

services/testagent-transform/internal/sink/client.go

@@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
-// Package sink posts a handover_payload to the (phase-1) dummy sink.
+// Package sink posts a handover envelope to the Phase-1 dummy sink.
 //
-// The payload is sent as the canonical JSON bytes the agent already hashed
-// into the transform attestation's subject digest — a byte-for-byte match
-// is a hard requirement for a downstream verifier, so we send those bytes
-// directly rather than re-marshaling.
+// The dummy-sink's contract (DEV-611) is `POST /api/v1/sink/dummy/deliver`
+// with a JSON wrapper `{decision_id, payload_hash, payload, approval_ref,
+// transform_ref}`. The sink re-hashes payload server-side and MUST see
+// `payload_hash` match either the raw bytes or the canonicalised form,
+// so we hand it the exact canonical bytes the transform attestation
+// already committed to.
 package sink
 
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
@@ -19,15 +22,6 @@ import (
 	"basicstack.de/proofedmesh/services/testagent-transform/internal/auth"
 )
 
-// SchemaHeader carries the payload's schema identifier so the sink knows
-// which decoder to pick. Phase-1 sinks are told to expect "sink.dummy.v1".
-const SchemaHeader = "X-Payload-Schema"
-
-// AttestationHeader carries the transform attestation's content_hash so
-// the sink can resolve the full attestation chain in the TLog without
-// re-parsing the signed envelope.
-const AttestationHeader = "X-Attestation-Ref"
-
 // ErrSinkUnavailable classifies connection errors and 5xx responses.
 var ErrSinkUnavailable = errors.New("sink: dummy-sink unavailable")
 
@@ -38,53 +32,100 @@ type Client struct {
 	TokenSource auth.TokenSource
 }
 
+// DeliverRequest carries everything the dummy-sink needs on its /deliver
+// endpoint. The runner builds this from the (approval_ref, transform_ref)
+// chain plus the canonical handover bytes.
+type DeliverRequest struct {
+	DecisionID   string
+	PayloadBytes []byte
+	PayloadHash  string
+	ApprovalRef  string
+	TransformRef string
+	Schema       string
+}
+
 // DeliverResult is what the agent reports upstream after a sink POST.
 type DeliverResult struct {
 	Status      int
+	HandoverRef string
+	LogIndex    int64
 }
 
-// Deliver POSTs payloadBytes to the sink. The caller passes the schema
-// identifier (e.g. "sink.dummy.v1") and the transform attestation's
-// content_hash so both go on the request headers.
-func (c Client) Deliver(ctx context.Context, schema, attestationRef string, payloadBytes []byte) (DeliverResult, error) {
+type deliverWire struct {
+	DecisionID   string          `json:"decision_id"`
+	PayloadHash  string          `json:"payload_hash"`
+	Payload      json.RawMessage `json:"payload"`
+	ApprovalRef  string          `json:"approval_ref"`
+	TransformRef string          `json:"transform_ref"`
+}
+
+type deliverResponseWire struct {
+	HandoverRef string `json:"handover_ref"`
+	LogIndex    int64  `json:"log_index"`
+	DecisionID  string `json:"decision_id"`
+}
+
+// Deliver POSTs the handover wrapper to the dummy-sink. The caller
+// passes the schema identifier (currently informational — the sink does
+// not read it) plus the canonical payload bytes committed to by the
+// transform attestation. The returned HandoverRef is the sink's own
+// handover attestation content_hash, surfaced so a caller can log it
+// alongside the transform ref for later chain inspection.
+func (c Client) Deliver(ctx context.Context, req DeliverRequest) (DeliverResult, error) {
 	if c.BaseURL == "" {
 		return DeliverResult{}, errors.New("sink.Client: BaseURL is empty")
 	}
-	if schema == "" {
-		return DeliverResult{}, errors.New("sink.Client: schema is required")
+	if req.DecisionID == "" {
+		return DeliverResult{}, errors.New("sink.Client: DecisionID is required")
 	}
-	if attestationRef == "" {
-		return DeliverResult{}, errors.New("sink.Client: attestationRef is required")
+	if len(req.PayloadBytes) == 0 {
+		return DeliverResult{}, errors.New("sink.Client: PayloadBytes is empty")
 	}
-	if len(payloadBytes) == 0 {
-		return DeliverResult{}, errors.New("sink.Client: payloadBytes is empty")
+	if req.PayloadHash == "" {
+		return DeliverResult{}, errors.New("sink.Client: PayloadHash is required")
 	}
+	if req.ApprovalRef == "" {
+		return DeliverResult{}, errors.New("sink.Client: ApprovalRef is required")
+	}
+	if req.TransformRef == "" {
+		return DeliverResult{}, errors.New("sink.Client: TransformRef is required")
+	}
+
 	hc := c.HTTPClient
 	if hc == nil {
 		hc = &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
 	}
-	endpoint, err := url.JoinPath(c.BaseURL, "/api/v1/handover")
+	endpoint, err := url.JoinPath(c.BaseURL, "/api/v1/sink/dummy/deliver")
 	if err != nil {
 		return DeliverResult{}, fmt.Errorf("sink: build url: %w", err)
 	}
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, endpoint, bytes.NewReader(payloadBytes))
+	wire := deliverWire{
+		DecisionID:   req.DecisionID,
+		PayloadHash:  req.PayloadHash,
+		Payload:      json.RawMessage(req.PayloadBytes),
+		ApprovalRef:  req.ApprovalRef,
+		TransformRef: req.TransformRef,
+	}
+	body, err := json.Marshal(wire)
+	if err != nil {
+		return DeliverResult{}, fmt.Errorf("sink: marshal body: %w", err)
+	}
+	httpReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, endpoint, bytes.NewReader(body))
 	if err != nil {
 		return DeliverResult{}, err
 	}
-	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-	req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
-	req.Header.Set(SchemaHeader, schema)
-	req.Header.Set(AttestationHeader, attestationRef)
+	httpReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	httpReq.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
 	if c.TokenSource != nil {
 		tok, err := c.TokenSource.Token(ctx)
 		if err != nil {
 			return DeliverResult{}, fmt.Errorf("sink: token: %w", err)
 		}
 		if tok != "" {
-			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
+			httpReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
 		}
 	}
-	resp, err := hc.Do(req)
+	resp, err := hc.Do(httpReq)
 	if err != nil {
 		return DeliverResult{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrSinkUnavailable, err)
 	}
@@ -92,7 +133,15 @@ func (c Client) Deliver(ctx context.Context, schema, attestationRef string, payl
 	raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
 	switch {
 	case resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300:
-		return DeliverResult{Status: resp.StatusCode}, nil
+		var out deliverResponseWire
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &out); err != nil {
+			return DeliverResult{}, fmt.Errorf("sink: decode response: %w (body=%q)", err, truncate(raw, 256))
+		}
+		return DeliverResult{
+			Status:      resp.StatusCode,
+			HandoverRef: out.HandoverRef,
+			LogIndex:    out.LogIndex,
+		}, nil
 	case resp.StatusCode >= 500:
 		return DeliverResult{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: status %d: %s", ErrSinkUnavailable, resp.StatusCode, truncate(raw, 256))
 	default:

services/testagent-transform/internal/transform/runner.go

@@ -60,8 +60,9 @@ type Config struct {
 	// TransformVersion is the agent's own version string, carried into
 	// the attestation so bugfixes are auditable.
 	TransformVersion string
-	// SinkPayloadSchema is the schema identifier the sink expects on the
-	// `X-Payload-Schema` header. Phase-1: "sink.dummy.v1".
+	// SinkPayloadSchema is the schema identifier recorded in the
+	// handover attestation and forwarded on the sink.DeliverRequest.
+	// Phase-1: "sink.dummy.v1".
 	SinkPayloadSchema string
 }
 
@@ -81,9 +82,9 @@ type TLogSubmitter interface {
 	Submit(ctx context.Context, env dsse.Envelope, contentHash string) (tlog.Receipt, error)
 }
 
-// SinkDeliverer posts the handover_payload bytes to the sink.
+// SinkDeliverer posts the handover wrapper to the sink.
 type SinkDeliverer interface {
-	Deliver(ctx context.Context, schema, attestationRef string, payloadBytes []byte) (sink.DeliverResult, error)
+	Deliver(ctx context.Context, req sink.DeliverRequest) (sink.DeliverResult, error)
 }
 
 // Request is a single transform invocation. HandoverPayload is JSON-shaped
@@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ type Result struct {
 	TransformRef    string
 	LogIndex        int64
 	SinkStatus      int
+	SinkHandoverRef string
 	HandoverHashHex string
 }
 
@@ -153,7 +155,18 @@ func (r *Runner) Execute(ctx context.Context, req Request) (Result, error) {
 		return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("tlog submit transform: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	deliv, err := r.Sink.Deliver(ctx, r.SinkPayloadSchema, signed.ContentHash, payloadBytes)
+	decisionID, err := extractDecisionID(req.HandoverPayload)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Result{}, err
+	}
+	deliv, err := r.Sink.Deliver(ctx, sink.DeliverRequest{
+		DecisionID:   decisionID,
+		PayloadBytes: payloadBytes,
+		PayloadHash:  "sha256:" + payloadHashHex,
+		ApprovalRef:  req.ApprovalRef,
+		TransformRef: signed.ContentHash,
+		Schema:       r.SinkPayloadSchema,
+	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("sink deliver: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -162,10 +175,27 @@ func (r *Runner) Execute(ctx context.Context, req Request) (Result, error) {
 		TransformRef:    signed.ContentHash,
 		LogIndex:        receipt.LogIndex,
 		SinkStatus:      deliv.Status,
+		SinkHandoverRef: deliv.HandoverRef,
 		HandoverHashHex: payloadHashHex,
 	}, nil
 }
 
+// extractDecisionID pulls the decision_id string from a handover payload.
+// Phase-1 handover payloads carry it at the top level; the sink requires
+// it to key its (idempotent) write and the verification-service's replay
+// guard.
+func extractDecisionID(payload map[string]any) (string, error) {
+	v, ok := payload["decision_id"]
+	if !ok {
+		return "", errors.New("transform: handover_payload is missing top-level decision_id")
+	}
+	s, ok := v.(string)
+	if !ok || s == "" {
+		return "", errors.New("transform: handover_payload decision_id must be a non-empty string")
+	}
+	return s, nil
+}
+
 func (r *Runner) validate(req Request) error {
 	if r.Approvals == nil || r.ApprovalKeyring == nil || r.Signer == nil || r.TLog == nil || r.Sink == nil {
 		return errors.New("transform.Runner: missing dependency wiring")

services/testagent-transform/internal/transform/runner_test.go

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
-	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"strings"
@@ -38,8 +37,10 @@ type mocks struct {
 	transformPriv ed25519.PrivateKey
 
 	sinkPayload      []byte
-	sinkSchema    string
-	sinkAttestRef string
+	sinkDecisionID   string
+	sinkPayloadHash  string
+	sinkApprovalRef  string
+	sinkTransformRef string
 	sinkCalled       bool
 
 	tlogSubmitted []string // sha256:… content_hashes seen on POST /log/entries
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@ const (
 
 func buildMocks(t *testing.T, opts mockOpts) *mocks {
 	t.Helper()
-	m := &mocks{sinkSchema: "sink.dummy.v1"}
+	m := &mocks{}
 
 	// Keys.
 	approvalPub, approvalPriv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
@@ -209,18 +210,38 @@ func buildMocks(t *testing.T, opts mockOpts) *mocks {
 		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(rcpt)
 	}))
 
-	// sinkSrv: POST /api/v1/handover; captures body + headers so the
-	// test can assert the agent sent exactly the canonical bytes.
+	// sinkSrv: POST /api/v1/sink/dummy/deliver with the DEV-611 wrapper
+	// shape; captures each field so the test can assert that the agent
+	// forwarded the canonical bytes verbatim and all four refs line up.
 	m.sinkSrv = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		if r.URL.Path != "/api/v1/handover" || r.Method != http.MethodPost {
+		if r.URL.Path != "/api/v1/sink/dummy/deliver" || r.Method != http.MethodPost {
 			http.NotFound(w, r)
 			return
 		}
 		m.sinkCalled = true
-		m.sinkSchema = r.Header.Get(sink.SchemaHeader)
-		m.sinkAttestRef = r.Header.Get(sink.AttestationHeader)
-		m.sinkPayload, _ = io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusAccepted)
+		var body struct {
+			DecisionID   string          `json:"decision_id"`
+			PayloadHash  string          `json:"payload_hash"`
+			Payload      json.RawMessage `json:"payload"`
+			ApprovalRef  string          `json:"approval_ref"`
+			TransformRef string          `json:"transform_ref"`
+		}
+		if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&body); err != nil {
+			http.Error(w, "decode: "+err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
+			return
+		}
+		m.sinkDecisionID = body.DecisionID
+		m.sinkPayloadHash = body.PayloadHash
+		m.sinkPayload = append(m.sinkPayload[:0], body.Payload...)
+		m.sinkApprovalRef = body.ApprovalRef
+		m.sinkTransformRef = body.TransformRef
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
+			"handover_ref": "sha256:" + strings.Repeat("d", 64),
+			"log_index":    int64(99),
+			"decision_id":  body.DecisionID,
+		})
 	}))
 
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
@@ -269,6 +290,7 @@ func sampleRequest() Request {
 		WorkflowID:  "WF-TEST-1",
 		ApprovalRef: attestationRef,
 		HandoverPayload: map[string]any{
+			"decision_id": "dec-WF-TEST-1",
 			"schema":      map[string]any{"name": "sink.dummy.v1", "version": "1.0.0"},
 			"items": []any{
 				map[string]any{"line": "1", "amount": "12.34"},
@@ -304,11 +326,20 @@ func TestExecute_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
 	if !bytes.Equal(m.sinkPayload, wantBytes) {
 		t.Fatalf("sink payload bytes differ:\n got %q\nwant %q", m.sinkPayload, wantBytes)
 	}
-	if m.sinkSchema != "sink.dummy.v1" {
-		t.Fatalf("sink schema header = %q", m.sinkSchema)
+	if m.sinkDecisionID != "dec-WF-TEST-1" {
+		t.Fatalf("sink decision_id = %q, want %q", m.sinkDecisionID, "dec-WF-TEST-1")
 	}
-	if m.sinkAttestRef != res.TransformRef {
-		t.Fatalf("sink attestation header = %q, want %q", m.sinkAttestRef, res.TransformRef)
+	if m.sinkPayloadHash != "sha256:"+wantHash {
+		t.Fatalf("sink payload_hash = %q, want %q", m.sinkPayloadHash, "sha256:"+wantHash)
+	}
+	if m.sinkApprovalRef != req.ApprovalRef {
+		t.Fatalf("sink approval_ref = %q, want %q", m.sinkApprovalRef, req.ApprovalRef)
+	}
+	if m.sinkTransformRef != res.TransformRef {
+		t.Fatalf("sink transform_ref = %q, want %q", m.sinkTransformRef, res.TransformRef)
+	}
+	if res.SinkHandoverRef == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("SinkHandoverRef unset — expected sink's handover_ref")
 	}
 
 	// TLog must have seen exactly our transform content_hash.
@@ -318,8 +349,8 @@ func TestExecute_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
 	if res.LogIndex == 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("LogIndex not set")
 	}
-	if res.SinkStatus != http.StatusAccepted {
-		t.Fatalf("SinkStatus = %d, want 202", res.SinkStatus)
+	if res.SinkStatus != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("SinkStatus = %d, want 201", res.SinkStatus)
 	}
 }
 

services/transparency-log/pkg/backend/memory.go

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ type Memory struct {
 	leaves            [][]byte            // ordered list of leaf hashes
 	indexByHash       map[string]int64    // contentHash -> log_index (zero-based)
 	loggedAtByIndex   map[int64]time.Time // original append time per index
+	envelopesByIndex  map[int64]Envelope  // original envelope per index (for Get)
 	now               func() time.Time
 }
 
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ func NewMemory() *Memory {
 	return &Memory{
 		indexByHash:      map[string]int64{},
 		loggedAtByIndex:  map[int64]time.Time{},
+		envelopesByIndex: map[int64]Envelope{},
 		now:              func() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() },
 	}
 }
@@ -73,6 +75,7 @@ func (m *Memory) Submit(_ context.Context, env Envelope, contentHash string) (Re
 		m.leaves = append(m.leaves, leafHash(canonical))
 		m.indexByHash[contentHash] = idx
 		m.loggedAtByIndex[idx] = m.now()
+		m.envelopesByIndex[idx] = env
 		fresh = true
 	}
 
@@ -99,6 +102,40 @@ func (m *Memory) Submit(_ context.Context, env Envelope, contentHash string) (Re
 	}, fresh, nil
 }
 
+// Get returns the stored envelope + a fresh inclusion proof against the
+// current tree. Suitable for the ADR-0005 read endpoint.
+func (m *Memory) Get(_ context.Context, contentHash string) (Entry, error) {
+	if contentHash == "" {
+		return Entry{}, errors.New("transparency-log: empty content_hash")
+	}
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+
+	idx, ok := m.indexByHash[contentHash]
+	if !ok {
+		return Entry{}, ErrEntryNotFound
+	}
+	env := m.envelopesByIndex[idx]
+	root := merkleTreeHash(m.leaves)
+	proof := auditPath(m.leaves, int(idx))
+	hashes := make([]string, 0, len(proof))
+	for _, h := range proof {
+		hashes = append(hashes, sha256Hex(h))
+	}
+	return Entry{
+		ContentHash: contentHash,
+		Envelope:    env,
+		LogIndex:    idx,
+		LoggedAt:    m.loggedAtByIndex[idx],
+		InclusionProof: InclusionProof{
+			TreeSize:          int64(len(m.leaves)),
+			TreeRootHash:      sha256Hex(root),
+			SignedTreeHeadRef: signedTreeHeadRef(int64(len(m.leaves)), root),
+			Hashes:            hashes,
+		},
+	}, nil
+}
+
 // signedTreeHeadRef is a stand-in for the real STH reference. In the
 // in-memory backend we deterministically derive it from (tree_size, root),
 // so callers get a stable per-head identifier without needing a signer.

services/transparency-log/pkg/backend/trillian.go

@@ -58,6 +58,13 @@ type Trillian struct {
 	dialErr  error
 }
 
+// Get is not yet wired against Trillian; the production read path is a
+// future subtask. The handler short-circuits to 503 when the client is
+// absent, so this stub only has to satisfy the interface.
+func (t *Trillian) Get(_ context.Context, _ string) (Entry, error) {
+	return Entry{}, ErrTrillianUnavailable
+}
+
 // Submit queues the envelope and returns the inclusion proof against the
 // current signed tree head. See the Backend interface for the fresh
 // semantics.

services/transparency-log/pkg/backend/types.go

@@ -47,6 +47,27 @@ type InclusionProof struct {
 // concurrent use and MUST be idempotent on contentHash: a repeated submit
 // with the same contentHash returns the originally assigned log_index and
 // a valid inclusion proof against the current tree size, and sets fresh=false.
+//
+// Get returns the stored envelope + a fresh inclusion proof against the
+// current tree size. Verifiers rely on this to independently recompute the
+// Merkle tree root (ADR-0005 §Read side).
 type Backend interface {
 	Submit(ctx context.Context, env Envelope, contentHash string) (receipt Receipt, fresh bool, err error)
+	Get(ctx context.Context, contentHash string) (Entry, error)
 }
+
+// Entry is the shape returned by GET /api/v1/log/entries/{content_hash}.
+type Entry struct {
+	ContentHash    string         `json:"content_hash"`
+	Envelope       Envelope       `json:"envelope"`
+	LogIndex       int64          `json:"log_index"`
+	LoggedAt       time.Time      `json:"logged_at"`
+	InclusionProof InclusionProof `json:"inclusion_proof"`
+}
+
+// ErrEntryNotFound is returned by Get when contentHash is not in the log.
+var ErrEntryNotFound = errorString("transparency-log: entry not found")
+
+type errorString string
+
+func (e errorString) Error() string { return string(e) }

services/transparency-log/pkg/httpapi/server.go

@@ -22,14 +22,44 @@ type Server struct {
 	LogError func(string, ...any)
 }
 
-// Handler returns an http.Handler that serves the ADR-0005 routes. Only
-// POST /api/v1/log/entries is implemented; everything else is 404.
+// Handler returns an http.Handler that serves the ADR-0005 routes plus a
+// liveness check at GET /healthz. Everything else is 404.
 func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 	mux.Handle("POST /api/v1/log/entries", http.HandlerFunc(s.handleSubmit))
+	mux.Handle("GET /api/v1/log/entries/{hash}", http.HandlerFunc(s.handleGetEntry))
+	mux.Handle("GET /healthz", http.HandlerFunc(s.handleHealth))
 	return mux
 }
 
+func (s *Server) handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
+}
+
+func (s *Server) handleGetEntry(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	hash := r.PathValue("hash")
+	if hash == "" {
+		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "content_hash is required")
+		return
+	}
+	entry, err := s.Backend.Get(r.Context(), hash)
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(err, backend.ErrEntryNotFound):
+		writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "entry not found")
+		return
+	case errors.Is(err, backend.ErrTrillianUnavailable):
+		writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, err.Error())
+		return
+	case err != nil:
+		s.logErr("transparency-log get: %v", err)
+		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, entry)
+}
+
 type submitRequest struct {
 	Envelope    backend.Envelope `json:"envelope"`
 	ContentHash string           `json:"content_hash"`

tools/webauthn-sign/go.mod

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+module basicstack.de/proofedmesh/tools/webauthn-sign
+
+go 1.23

tools/webauthn-sign/main.go

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+// Command webauthn-sign is a Phase-1 smoke-test helper. It performs the
+// two WebAuthn crypto operations the shell driver cannot easily do with
+// openssl: generate an Ed25519 keypair (so the approval-service can
+// pre-register a mock credential) and produce a WebAuthn PublicKey
+// assertion over a server-supplied challenge (so the smoke test can
+// drive /api/v1/approvals/confirm without a browser).
+//
+// Two subcommands:
+//
+//   gen-key                      → {"priv_hex": "...", "pub_hex": "..."}
+//   sign-assertion [flags]       → {"credential_id": "...", "client_data_json": "...",
+//                                   "authenticator_data": "...", "signature": "..."}
+//
+// Everything is base64url-encoded without padding, matching the wire
+// format the approval-service's WebAuthn shim accepts.
+package main
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"flag"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+func main() {
+	if len(os.Args) < 2 {
+		die("usage: webauthn-sign {gen-key|sign-assertion}")
+	}
+	switch os.Args[1] {
+	case "gen-key":
+		runGenKey()
+	case "sign-assertion":
+		runSignAssertion(os.Args[2:])
+	default:
+		die("unknown subcommand %q", os.Args[1])
+	}
+}
+
+func runGenKey() {
+	pub, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		die("gen key: %v", err)
+	}
+	out := map[string]string{
+		"priv_hex":    hex.EncodeToString(priv),
+		"pub_hex":     hex.EncodeToString(pub),
+		"pub_b64url":  base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(pub),
+	}
+	writeJSON(out)
+}
+
+func runSignAssertion(argv []string) {
+	fs := flag.NewFlagSet("sign-assertion", flag.ExitOnError)
+	var (
+		privHex       = fs.String("priv-hex", "", "hex-encoded 64-byte Ed25519 private key")
+		challengeB64u = fs.String("challenge-b64url", "", "base64url (no pad) WebAuthn challenge bytes")
+		rpID          = fs.String("rp-id", "", "WebAuthn relying party id (hostname)")
+		origin        = fs.String("origin", "", "browser origin (e.g. https://trust.basicstack.de)")
+		credentialID  = fs.String("credential-id", "", "credential_id to emit on the wire; defaults to b64url(pub)")
+	)
+	if err := fs.Parse(argv); err != nil {
+		die("parse flags: %v", err)
+	}
+	if *privHex == "" || *challengeB64u == "" || *rpID == "" || *origin == "" {
+		die("sign-assertion requires -priv-hex, -challenge-b64url, -rp-id, -origin")
+	}
+
+	privRaw, err := hex.DecodeString(*privHex)
+	if err != nil {
+		die("decode priv-hex: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(privRaw) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize {
+		die("priv-hex must decode to %d bytes, got %d", ed25519.PrivateKeySize, len(privRaw))
+	}
+	priv := ed25519.PrivateKey(privRaw)
+	pub := priv.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey)
+	credID := *credentialID
+	if credID == "" {
+		credID = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(pub)
+	}
+
+	// Build clientDataJSON per the WebAuthn spec.
+	clientData := map[string]any{
+		"type":      "webauthn.get",
+		"challenge": strings.TrimRight(*challengeB64u, "="),
+		"origin":    *origin,
+	}
+	clientDataJSON, err := json.Marshal(clientData)
+	if err != nil {
+		die("marshal clientDataJSON: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// authenticator_data = sha256(rpID) || flags (0x01=UP) || signCount (4 bytes, zero).
+	rpHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(*rpID))
+	authData := make([]byte, 0, 37)
+	authData = append(authData, rpHash[:]...)
+	authData = append(authData, 0x01)
+	authData = append(authData, 0, 0, 0, 0)
+
+	// Signed bytes = authenticator_data || sha256(clientDataJSON).
+	cdHash := sha256.Sum256(clientDataJSON)
+	signed := make([]byte, 0, len(authData)+len(cdHash))
+	signed = append(signed, authData...)
+	signed = append(signed, cdHash[:]...)
+	sig := ed25519.Sign(priv, signed)
+
+	out := map[string]string{
+		"credential_id":       credID,
+		"client_data_json":    base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(clientDataJSON),
+		"authenticator_data":  base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(authData),
+		"signature":           base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig),
+	}
+	writeJSON(out)
+}
+
+func writeJSON(v any) {
+	enc := json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout)
+	enc.SetIndent("", "  ")
+	if err := enc.Encode(v); err != nil {
+		die("encode output: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func die(format string, args ...any) {
+	fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "webauthn-sign: "+format+"\n", args...)
+	os.Exit(1)
+}