ProofedMesh/services/dummy-sink/internal/verify/client.go
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dummy-sink: Phase-1 mock sink (sink:dummy-sink) (DEV-611)
Trivial Senken-Adapter per §7 of architecture V1.1. Accepts
{decision_id, payload_hash, payload, approval_ref, transform_ref}
on POST /api/v1/sink/dummy/deliver; calls verification-service's
/api/v1/verify/chain and branches:

- valid=true → atomic .tmp+rename write of payload to
  /data/dummy-sink/<decision_id>.json, builds a
  basicstack.de/attestations/handover/v1 statement, signs via
  signing-service with the double identity flow (Pocket-ID bearer
  + projected SA token), submits DSSE envelope to the TLog and
  returns 201 {handover_ref, log_index}.
- valid=false & replay=true → 409.
- valid=false → 403 {reasons:[…]}.

Replay protection lives in verification-service per the parent plan;
dummy-sink keeps no local replay store. The payload_hash field is
verified against both the raw and canonical form so a verifier can
reproduce either hash.

Tests use httptest-backed fakes for verify / sign / tlog and cover
the DEV-611 acceptance criteria plus the bad-request shapes:
- happy path writes the file, calls signer with the handover
  statement, submits the envelope to the TLog
- 403 keeps the disk and never calls signer/tlog
- replay returns 409 without re-signing
- payload_hash mismatch rejects before verify
- malformed bodies return 400
- verify unavailable → 502, signing denied → 403

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-25 20:20:40 +00:00

111 lines
3.4 KiB
Go

// Package verify calls the verification-service's POST
// /api/v1/verify/chain endpoint. Replay protection for `decision_id` lives
// in the verification-service — the sink does not keep its own replay
// table. See the parent plan subtask 6 for the exact chain checks.
package verify
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"time"
"basicstack.de/proofedmesh/services/dummy-sink/internal/auth"
)
// ErrVerifyUnavailable classifies connection errors and 5xx responses.
var ErrVerifyUnavailable = errors.New("verify: verification-service unavailable")
// Request is the payload posted to the verification-service.
type Request struct {
DecisionID string `json:"decision_id"`
PayloadHash string `json:"payload_hash"`
ApprovalRef string `json:"approval_ref"`
TransformRef string `json:"transform_ref"`
SinkTarget string `json:"sink_target"`
}
// Result is the verification-service's structured verdict. The field set
// matches the Phase-1 plan: valid, decision_id, actors, reasons, plus a
// dedicated `replay` flag so the sink can map replays to 409.
type Result struct {
Valid bool `json:"valid"`
Replay bool `json:"replay"`
DecisionID string `json:"decision_id"`
Actors []string `json:"actors,omitempty"`
Reasons []string `json:"reasons,omitempty"`
ApprovalRef string `json:"approval_ref,omitempty"`
}
// Client calls POST /api/v1/verify/chain.
type Client struct {
BaseURL string
HTTPClient *http.Client
TokenSource auth.TokenSource
}
// Verify asks the verification-service whether the chain (approval ->
// transform) authorises writing payloadHash to sinkTarget.
func (c Client) Verify(ctx context.Context, req Request) (Result, error) {
if c.BaseURL == "" {
return Result{}, errors.New("verify.Client: BaseURL is empty")
}
hc := c.HTTPClient
if hc == nil {
hc = &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
}
body, err := json.Marshal(req)
if err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("verify: marshal: %w", err)
}
endpoint, err := url.JoinPath(c.BaseURL, "/api/v1/verify/chain")
if err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("verify: build url: %w", err)
}
httpReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, endpoint, bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return Result{}, err
}
httpReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
httpReq.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
if c.TokenSource != nil {
tok, err := c.TokenSource.Token(ctx)
if err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("verify: token: %w", err)
}
if tok != "" {
httpReq.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
}
}
resp, err := hc.Do(httpReq)
if err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrVerifyUnavailable, err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
switch {
case resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK:
// fall through
case resp.StatusCode >= 500:
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: status %d: %s", ErrVerifyUnavailable, resp.StatusCode, truncate(raw, 256))
default:
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("verify: status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, truncate(raw, 256))
}
var out Result
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &out); err != nil {
return Result{}, fmt.Errorf("verify: decode: %w", err)
}
return out, nil
}
func truncate(b []byte, n int) string {
if len(b) <= n {
return string(b)
}
return string(b[:n]) + "…"
}