ProofedMesh/services/signing-service/internal/token/k8s_tokenreview.go
CTO (Paperclip) 30dd2f8b65 signing-service: Pocket-ID JWKS + K8s TokenReview + OPA (DEV-609)
Wires the signing-service's production path for ProofedMesh Phase 1:
the service now performs a double identity check (Pocket-ID OIDC JWT
+ K8s ServiceAccount TokenReview), reconciles both against the
trust-api `agents` registry, and asks an OPA/Rego policy whether the
caller may sign with the requested key_ref.

Code
- internal/token/pocket_id.go: OIDC-Discovery-backed JWKS validator
  with automatic kid rotation (coreos/go-oidc).
- internal/token/k8s_tokenreview.go: hand-rolled TokenReview client;
  reads X-Workload-Token, posts to authentication.k8s.io/v1 via the
  pod's in-cluster SA token + CA.
- internal/registry: Postgres resolver for the agents table +
  in-memory Static resolver for tests.
- internal/policy/opa.go: OPA/rego StructuredDecider; input carries
  both lookups so the policy can enforce identity consistency AND
  the key_ref ↔ role mapping.
- internal/httpapi/sign.go: new structured flow when
  Validator+TokenReviewer+Registry+StructuredPolicy are all wired;
  dev path (static bearers + AllowAll) remains intact.
- cmd/signing-service/main.go: -pocket-id-issuer,
  -pocket-id-audience, -k8s-tokenreview, -registry-dsn,
  -policy-bundle flags.

Policy
- policies/sinks/signing_service.rego: identities_agree +
  key_ref_matches_role rules; agent → key_ref prefix map covers
  approval-service, testagent-transform, dummy-sink.

Deploy
- deploy/signing-service/01-rbac.yaml: ClusterRole with
  tokenreviews.create + binding to the signing-service SA.
- deploy/signing-service/20-deployment.yaml: adds POCKET_ID_ISSUER,
  POCKET_ID_AUDIENCE, TRUST_PG_DSN env, projected SA token volume,
  OPA policy ConfigMap mount, structured flags.
- deploy/signing-service/00-serviceaccount.yaml: disables default
  auto-mount; a projected volume is used.
- deploy/signing-service/README.md: documents prod flags +
  ConfigMap generation.

Tests
- httptest-mock Pocket-ID (OIDC discovery + JWKS, kid rotation),
  StaticTokenReviewer fake, Static registry, real Rego policy.
- Happy paths: Approval-Service → trust-api/approval-signer-2026-q4;
  testagent-transform → trust-api/agent-testagent-transform-2026-q4.
- Denies: registry mismatch, wrong key_ref for role, missing /
  bad workload token, bad Pocket-ID token, kid rotation.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-25 19:42:40 +00:00

223 lines
7.2 KiB
Go

// Kubernetes TokenReview-backed workload-identity validator.
//
// The signing-service receives the workload's projected ServiceAccount
// token in the `X-Workload-Token` header. We submit that token to the
// cluster via `authentication.k8s.io/v1 TokenReview` using the pod's own
// in-cluster credentials, and return the authenticated
// `system:serviceaccount:<ns>:<sa>` as (namespace, serviceAccount).
//
// This file deliberately does not import k8s.io/client-go to keep the
// dependency surface narrow; a hand-rolled HTTPS POST against the API
// server is all that's required.
package token
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
)
const (
// WorkloadTokenHeader is the HTTP header carrying the workload's
// projected SA token (not the Authorization header).
WorkloadTokenHeader = "X-Workload-Token"
defaultSATokenPath = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"
defaultCAPath = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt"
)
// ErrNoWorkloadToken is returned when the X-Workload-Token header is
// missing. Caller MUST map this to a 401.
var ErrNoWorkloadToken = errors.New("tokenreview: missing X-Workload-Token header")
// ErrWorkloadAuthFailed is returned when TokenReview reports the token is
// invalid or unauthenticated. Caller MUST map this to a 401.
var ErrWorkloadAuthFailed = errors.New("tokenreview: workload token not authenticated")
// K8sIdentity is the subset of a TokenReview UserInfo we care about.
type K8sIdentity struct {
Namespace string
ServiceAccount string
// UID is the ServiceAccount's UID (useful for audit; may be empty for
// non-SA callers which should be rejected before this type is built).
UID string
}
// TokenReviewer validates a workload-presented token and returns the
// authenticated ServiceAccount identity.
type TokenReviewer interface {
Review(ctx context.Context, workloadToken string) (K8sIdentity, error)
}
// FromWorkloadHeader extracts the workload token from the X-Workload-Token
// header; it does NOT accept Bearer prefixes because this header is
// documented as raw-token.
func FromWorkloadHeader(r *http.Request) (string, error) {
t := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get(WorkloadTokenHeader))
if t == "" {
return "", ErrNoWorkloadToken
}
return t, nil
}
// StaticTokenReviewer is a test seam: a fixed table from workload token
// → identity. All production paths use K8sTokenReviewer.
type StaticTokenReviewer map[string]K8sIdentity
func (s StaticTokenReviewer) Review(_ context.Context, workloadToken string) (K8sIdentity, error) {
id, ok := s[workloadToken]
if !ok {
return K8sIdentity{}, ErrWorkloadAuthFailed
}
return id, nil
}
// K8sTokenReviewer talks to a Kubernetes API server.
type K8sTokenReviewer struct {
APIServer string // e.g. "https://kubernetes.default.svc"
BearerToken string // pod's own SA token (not the workload token)
HTTPClient *http.Client
}
// NewInClusterTokenReviewer loads the pod's SA token and the cluster CA
// from the standard in-cluster paths and wires up a TLS-pinned client.
// The returned reviewer talks to `https://kubernetes.default.svc`.
func NewInClusterTokenReviewer() (*K8sTokenReviewer, error) {
return NewTokenReviewerFromPaths(
"https://kubernetes.default.svc",
defaultSATokenPath,
defaultCAPath,
)
}
// NewTokenReviewerFromPaths loads SA token & CA from explicit paths; the
// in-cluster helper above is a thin wrapper.
func NewTokenReviewerFromPaths(apiServer, tokenPath, caPath string) (*K8sTokenReviewer, error) {
tokenBytes, err := os.ReadFile(tokenPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tokenreview: read SA token: %w", err)
}
caBytes, err := os.ReadFile(caPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tokenreview: read CA: %w", err)
}
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(caBytes) {
return nil, errors.New("tokenreview: CA pem invalid")
}
hc := &http.Client{
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
Transport: &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{RootCAs: pool, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12},
},
}
return &K8sTokenReviewer{
APIServer: apiServer,
BearerToken: strings.TrimSpace(string(tokenBytes)),
HTTPClient: hc,
}, nil
}
// tokenReviewRequest / tokenReviewResponse mirror just the fields we
// read, so we don't pull in client-go's typed meta.
type tokenReviewRequest struct {
APIVersion string `json:"apiVersion"`
Kind string `json:"kind"`
Spec tokenReviewRequestSpec `json:"spec"`
}
type tokenReviewRequestSpec struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
}
type tokenReviewResponse struct {
Status tokenReviewStatus `json:"status"`
}
type tokenReviewStatus struct {
Authenticated bool `json:"authenticated"`
User tokenReviewUserInfo `json:"user"`
Error string `json:"error"`
}
type tokenReviewUserInfo struct {
Username string `json:"username"`
UID string `json:"uid"`
}
func (r *K8sTokenReviewer) Review(ctx context.Context, workloadToken string) (K8sIdentity, error) {
if workloadToken == "" {
return K8sIdentity{}, ErrNoWorkloadToken
}
payload := tokenReviewRequest{
APIVersion: "authentication.k8s.io/v1",
Kind: "TokenReview",
Spec: tokenReviewRequestSpec{Token: workloadToken},
}
body, err := json.Marshal(payload)
if err != nil {
return K8sIdentity{}, fmt.Errorf("tokenreview: marshal: %w", err)
}
url := strings.TrimRight(r.APIServer, "/") + "/apis/authentication.k8s.io/v1/tokenreviews"
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", url, bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return K8sIdentity{}, fmt.Errorf("tokenreview: build request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+r.BearerToken)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
resp, err := r.HTTPClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return K8sIdentity{}, fmt.Errorf("tokenreview: POST: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
if resp.StatusCode/100 != 2 {
return K8sIdentity{}, fmt.Errorf("tokenreview: api server %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, truncate(string(raw), 256))
}
var out tokenReviewResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &out); err != nil {
return K8sIdentity{}, fmt.Errorf("tokenreview: decode: %w", err)
}
if !out.Status.Authenticated {
if out.Status.Error != "" {
return K8sIdentity{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrWorkloadAuthFailed, out.Status.Error)
}
return K8sIdentity{}, ErrWorkloadAuthFailed
}
ns, sa, ok := parseSAUsername(out.Status.User.Username)
if !ok {
return K8sIdentity{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: not a ServiceAccount: %q", ErrWorkloadAuthFailed, out.Status.User.Username)
}
return K8sIdentity{Namespace: ns, ServiceAccount: sa, UID: out.Status.User.UID}, nil
}
// parseSAUsername extracts (ns, sa) from `system:serviceaccount:<ns>:<sa>`.
func parseSAUsername(u string) (string, string, bool) {
const prefix = "system:serviceaccount:"
if !strings.HasPrefix(u, prefix) {
return "", "", false
}
rest := u[len(prefix):]
i := strings.IndexByte(rest, ':')
if i <= 0 || i == len(rest)-1 {
return "", "", false
}
return rest[:i], rest[i+1:], true
}
func truncate(s string, n int) string {
if len(s) <= n {
return s
}
return s[:n] + "…"
}