3a01cc651f
New services/approval-service with the Session → Preview → Confirm
pipeline required by DEV-606/DEV-608:
* POST /api/v1/sessions starts a Pocket-ID-bound approval session.
* POST /api/v1/approvals/preview renders content server-side, computes
H_content = sha256(canonical JSON), stores the (nonce, salt, canonical,
challenge) tuple and returns the human verification digits plus the
WebAuthn challenge = nonce || H_content.
* POST /api/v1/approvals/confirm verifies the WebAuthn assertion against
the stored challenge, DSSE-signs the Approval statement via the
signing-service (key_ref=trust-api/approval-signer-2026-q4), submits
to the transparency-log, and returns {approval_id, attestation_ref,
log_index}. TLog failures leave the row at attestation-pending for
the reconciler.
* db/trust/migrations/0004_approval_sessions.{up,down}.sql: new tables
approval_sessions, approval_previews, approvals (schema matches the
Phase 1 store contract).
* internal/content: canonical JSON + H_content + 6-digit verification
code (byte-compatible with signing-service/internal/canonical).
* internal/webauthn: stdlib-only Phase-1 verifier; wire shape stays
WebAuthn-compatible for the Phase-2 swap to go-webauthn/webauthn.
* internal/signer, internal/tlog: HTTP clients mapping 5xx / connection
errors to typed ErrSignerUnavailable / ErrTLogUnavailable so the
HTTP layer can return 502 for signing failures and persist
attestation-pending on TLog failure.
* internal/service.Orchestrator ties the pipeline together and persists
the Approval BEFORE the TLog submit (never return a log_index for
an un-persisted approval).
Tests cover: happy path, tampered H_content → 400, expired challenge
→ 403, signer 5xx + conn-refused → 502, TLog failure → row stays
attestation-pending, duplicate confirm → 409, session expired → 403.
go vet clean, go test ./... passes.
Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
62 lines
1.9 KiB
Go
62 lines
1.9 KiB
Go
// Package auth carries the authenticated principal across the HTTP stack
|
|
// so handlers do not re-decode the Pocket-ID session cookie on each call.
|
|
// The Pocket-ID verification lives in services/admin-api/internal/auth; the
|
|
// approval-service accepts a Principal already stamped by the gateway or
|
|
// its own future middleware wrap (Phase 2).
|
|
package auth
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
type ctxKey int
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
principalKey ctxKey = iota
|
|
sessionKey
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// Principal is the subject identifier (Pocket-ID `sub`) of the browser user
|
|
// driving the approval. Attestations will carry it as `performed_by.sub`.
|
|
type Principal struct {
|
|
Sub string
|
|
Groups []string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ErrNoPrincipal is returned by MustPrincipal when the request context did
|
|
// not carry an authenticated principal.
|
|
var ErrNoPrincipal = errors.New("auth: request is not authenticated")
|
|
|
|
// WithPrincipal returns a copy of ctx carrying p.
|
|
func WithPrincipal(ctx context.Context, p Principal) context.Context {
|
|
return context.WithValue(ctx, principalKey, p)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// FromContext returns the Principal stamped by WithPrincipal.
|
|
func FromContext(ctx context.Context) (Principal, bool) {
|
|
p, ok := ctx.Value(principalKey).(Principal)
|
|
return p, ok
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MustFromContext is a convenience that returns ErrNoPrincipal when no
|
|
// principal is present.
|
|
func MustFromContext(ctx context.Context) (Principal, error) {
|
|
p, ok := FromContext(ctx)
|
|
if !ok || p.Sub == "" {
|
|
return Principal{}, ErrNoPrincipal
|
|
}
|
|
return p, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// WithSession binds the Pocket-ID `sid` claim to ctx. Approval-sessions
|
|
// scope themselves to the browser login via this value.
|
|
func WithSession(ctx context.Context, sid string) context.Context {
|
|
return context.WithValue(ctx, sessionKey, sid)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SessionFromContext returns the browser sid carried in ctx.
|
|
func SessionFromContext(ctx context.Context) (string, bool) {
|
|
s, ok := ctx.Value(sessionKey).(string)
|
|
return s, ok && s != ""
|
|
}
|