ProofedMesh/services/dummy-sink/internal/tlog/client.go
CTO (Paperclip) b45ad34169
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dummy-sink: Phase-1 mock sink (sink:dummy-sink) (DEV-611)
Trivial Senken-Adapter per §7 of architecture V1.1. Accepts
{decision_id, payload_hash, payload, approval_ref, transform_ref}
on POST /api/v1/sink/dummy/deliver; calls verification-service's
/api/v1/verify/chain and branches:

- valid=true → atomic .tmp+rename write of payload to
  /data/dummy-sink/<decision_id>.json, builds a
  basicstack.de/attestations/handover/v1 statement, signs via
  signing-service with the double identity flow (Pocket-ID bearer
  + projected SA token), submits DSSE envelope to the TLog and
  returns 201 {handover_ref, log_index}.
- valid=false & replay=true → 409.
- valid=false → 403 {reasons:[…]}.

Replay protection lives in verification-service per the parent plan;
dummy-sink keeps no local replay store. The payload_hash field is
verified against both the raw and canonical form so a verifier can
reproduce either hash.

Tests use httptest-backed fakes for verify / sign / tlog and cover
the DEV-611 acceptance criteria plus the bad-request shapes:
- happy path writes the file, calls signer with the handover
  statement, submits the envelope to the TLog
- 403 keeps the disk and never calls signer/tlog
- replay returns 409 without re-signing
- payload_hash mismatch rejects before verify
- malformed bodies return 400
- verify unavailable → 502, signing denied → 403

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-25 20:20:40 +00:00

119 lines
3.7 KiB
Go

// Package tlog submits attestation envelopes to the transparency-log per
// POST /api/v1/log/entries (ADR-0005). The TLog is idempotent on
// content_hash: re-submitting the same (envelope, content_hash) returns
// the original log_index.
package tlog
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"time"
"basicstack.de/proofedmesh/services/dummy-sink/internal/auth"
"basicstack.de/proofedmesh/services/dummy-sink/internal/dsse"
)
// InclusionProof mirrors the server-side ADR-0005 inclusion proof.
type InclusionProof struct {
TreeSize int64 `json:"tree_size"`
TreeRootHash string `json:"tree_root_hash"`
SignedTreeHeadRef string `json:"signed_tree_head_ref"`
Hashes []string `json:"hashes"`
}
// Receipt is what the TLog returns on a successful submit.
type Receipt struct {
LogIndex int64 `json:"log_index"`
ContentHash string `json:"content_hash"`
LoggedAt time.Time `json:"logged_at"`
InclusionProof InclusionProof `json:"inclusion_proof"`
}
// ErrTLogUnavailable classifies connection errors and 5xx responses.
var ErrTLogUnavailable = errors.New("tlog: transparency-log unavailable")
// Client is the TLog submit client.
type Client struct {
BaseURL string
HTTPClient *http.Client
TokenSource auth.TokenSource
}
type submitRequest struct {
Envelope dsse.Envelope `json:"envelope"`
ContentHash string `json:"content_hash"`
}
// Submit posts env + its contentHash to the TLog. Returns the receipt on
// 200/201 (idempotent repeat / fresh insert) and ErrTLogUnavailable on
// transport/5xx. Other non-2xx responses are reported with the raw status.
func (c Client) Submit(ctx context.Context, env dsse.Envelope, contentHash string) (Receipt, error) {
if c.BaseURL == "" {
return Receipt{}, errors.New("tlog.Client: BaseURL is empty")
}
hc := c.HTTPClient
if hc == nil {
hc = &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
}
body, err := json.Marshal(submitRequest{Envelope: env, ContentHash: contentHash})
if err != nil {
return Receipt{}, fmt.Errorf("tlog: marshal submit: %w", err)
}
endpoint, err := url.JoinPath(c.BaseURL, "/api/v1/log/entries")
if err != nil {
return Receipt{}, fmt.Errorf("tlog: build url: %w", err)
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, endpoint, bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return Receipt{}, err
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
if c.TokenSource != nil {
tok, err := c.TokenSource.Token(ctx)
if err != nil {
return Receipt{}, fmt.Errorf("tlog: token: %w", err)
}
if tok != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+tok)
}
}
resp, err := hc.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return Receipt{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrTLogUnavailable, err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
raw, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
switch {
case resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK, resp.StatusCode == http.StatusCreated:
// ok
case resp.StatusCode >= 500:
return Receipt{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: status %d: %s", ErrTLogUnavailable, resp.StatusCode, truncate(raw, 256))
default:
return Receipt{}, fmt.Errorf("tlog: status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, truncate(raw, 256))
}
var out Receipt
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &out); err != nil {
return Receipt{}, fmt.Errorf("tlog: decode receipt: %w", err)
}
if out.ContentHash != contentHash {
return out, fmt.Errorf("tlog returned content_hash %q != sent %q", out.ContentHash, contentHash)
}
if out.LogIndex < 0 {
return out, fmt.Errorf("tlog returned negative log_index %d", out.LogIndex)
}
return out, nil
}
func truncate(b []byte, n int) string {
if len(b) <= n {
return string(b)
}
return string(b[:n]) + "…"
}