New services/approval-service with the Session → Preview → Confirm
pipeline required by DEV-606/DEV-608:
* POST /api/v1/sessions starts a Pocket-ID-bound approval session.
* POST /api/v1/approvals/preview renders content server-side, computes
H_content = sha256(canonical JSON), stores the (nonce, salt, canonical,
challenge) tuple and returns the human verification digits plus the
WebAuthn challenge = nonce || H_content.
* POST /api/v1/approvals/confirm verifies the WebAuthn assertion against
the stored challenge, DSSE-signs the Approval statement via the
signing-service (key_ref=trust-api/approval-signer-2026-q4), submits
to the transparency-log, and returns {approval_id, attestation_ref,
log_index}. TLog failures leave the row at attestation-pending for
the reconciler.
* db/trust/migrations/0004_approval_sessions.{up,down}.sql: new tables
approval_sessions, approval_previews, approvals (schema matches the
Phase 1 store contract).
* internal/content: canonical JSON + H_content + 6-digit verification
code (byte-compatible with signing-service/internal/canonical).
* internal/webauthn: stdlib-only Phase-1 verifier; wire shape stays
WebAuthn-compatible for the Phase-2 swap to go-webauthn/webauthn.
* internal/signer, internal/tlog: HTTP clients mapping 5xx / connection
errors to typed ErrSignerUnavailable / ErrTLogUnavailable so the
HTTP layer can return 502 for signing failures and persist
attestation-pending on TLog failure.
* internal/service.Orchestrator ties the pipeline together and persists
the Approval BEFORE the TLog submit (never return a log_index for
an un-persisted approval).
Tests cover: happy path, tampered H_content → 400, expired challenge
→ 403, signer 5xx + conn-refused → 502, TLog failure → row stays
attestation-pending, duplicate confirm → 409, session expired → 403.
go vet clean, go test ./... passes.
Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
97 lines
3 KiB
Go
97 lines
3 KiB
Go
// Package sessions implements the Session → Preview → Confirm pipeline on
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// top of a Store. Keeping it one layer above the HTTP handlers lets the
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// unit tests exercise business logic without an httptest server.
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package sessions
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/base64"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"basicstack.de/proofedmesh/services/approval-service/internal/store"
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)
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// IDGenerator returns opaque collision-resistant IDs. The default
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// implementation uses crypto/rand; tests inject a deterministic one.
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type IDGenerator func(prefix string) (string, error)
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// DefaultIDGenerator produces "<prefix>_" + 24 random base64url chars.
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func DefaultIDGenerator(prefix string) (string, error) {
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b := make([]byte, 18)
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if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("id: %w", err)
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}
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return prefix + "_" + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b), nil
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}
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// Manager orchestrates sessions on top of a Store. Its only state is the
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// clock and ID generator; all persistence happens through Store.
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type Manager struct {
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Store store.Store
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Now func() time.Time
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GenID IDGenerator
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SessionTTL time.Duration
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ChallengeTTL time.Duration
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}
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// New constructs a Manager with safe defaults for Now, GenID, SessionTTL
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// (15m) and ChallengeTTL (2m) when the caller leaves them zero.
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func New(s store.Store) *Manager {
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return &Manager{
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Store: s,
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Now: time.Now,
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GenID: DefaultIDGenerator,
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SessionTTL: 15 * time.Minute,
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ChallengeTTL: 2 * time.Minute,
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}
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}
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// StartSession creates a fresh approval_session for userSub.
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func (m *Manager) StartSession(ctx context.Context, userSub string) (store.Session, error) {
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if userSub == "" {
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return store.Session{}, errors.New("sessions: userSub is empty")
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}
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id, err := m.GenID("sess")
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if err != nil {
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return store.Session{}, err
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}
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now := m.Now()
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s := store.Session{
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ID: id,
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UserSub: userSub,
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ActiveUntil: now.Add(m.SessionTTL),
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CreatedAt: now,
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}
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if err := m.Store.CreateSession(ctx, s); err != nil {
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return store.Session{}, err
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}
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return s, nil
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}
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// ErrSessionExpired is returned by GetActiveSession when the session
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// row exists but active_until is in the past.
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var ErrSessionExpired = errors.New("sessions: session expired")
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// GetActiveSession returns the session when it is still within
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// active_until. Enforces session_id ↔ user_sub binding (the caller passes
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// the authenticated userSub so a leaked session_id cannot be used from
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// another account).
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func (m *Manager) GetActiveSession(ctx context.Context, sessionID, userSub string) (store.Session, error) {
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s, err := m.Store.GetSession(ctx, sessionID)
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if err != nil {
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return store.Session{}, err
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}
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if s.UserSub != userSub {
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// Explicit NotFound so handlers return 404 instead of leaking the
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// mismatch — a probing attacker cannot distinguish "wrong user"
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// from "unknown session".
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return store.Session{}, store.ErrNotFound
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}
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if !m.Now().Before(s.ActiveUntil) {
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return store.Session{}, ErrSessionExpired
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}
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return s, nil
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}
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