ProofedMesh/services/signing-service/internal/policy/policy.go
CTO (Paperclip) 30dd2f8b65 signing-service: Pocket-ID JWKS + K8s TokenReview + OPA (DEV-609)
Wires the signing-service's production path for ProofedMesh Phase 1:
the service now performs a double identity check (Pocket-ID OIDC JWT
+ K8s ServiceAccount TokenReview), reconciles both against the
trust-api `agents` registry, and asks an OPA/Rego policy whether the
caller may sign with the requested key_ref.

Code
- internal/token/pocket_id.go: OIDC-Discovery-backed JWKS validator
  with automatic kid rotation (coreos/go-oidc).
- internal/token/k8s_tokenreview.go: hand-rolled TokenReview client;
  reads X-Workload-Token, posts to authentication.k8s.io/v1 via the
  pod's in-cluster SA token + CA.
- internal/registry: Postgres resolver for the agents table +
  in-memory Static resolver for tests.
- internal/policy/opa.go: OPA/rego StructuredDecider; input carries
  both lookups so the policy can enforce identity consistency AND
  the key_ref ↔ role mapping.
- internal/httpapi/sign.go: new structured flow when
  Validator+TokenReviewer+Registry+StructuredPolicy are all wired;
  dev path (static bearers + AllowAll) remains intact.
- cmd/signing-service/main.go: -pocket-id-issuer,
  -pocket-id-audience, -k8s-tokenreview, -registry-dsn,
  -policy-bundle flags.

Policy
- policies/sinks/signing_service.rego: identities_agree +
  key_ref_matches_role rules; agent → key_ref prefix map covers
  approval-service, testagent-transform, dummy-sink.

Deploy
- deploy/signing-service/01-rbac.yaml: ClusterRole with
  tokenreviews.create + binding to the signing-service SA.
- deploy/signing-service/20-deployment.yaml: adds POCKET_ID_ISSUER,
  POCKET_ID_AUDIENCE, TRUST_PG_DSN env, projected SA token volume,
  OPA policy ConfigMap mount, structured flags.
- deploy/signing-service/00-serviceaccount.yaml: disables default
  auto-mount; a projected volume is used.
- deploy/signing-service/README.md: documents prod flags +
  ConfigMap generation.

Tests
- httptest-mock Pocket-ID (OIDC discovery + JWKS, kid rotation),
  StaticTokenReviewer fake, Static registry, real Rego policy.
- Happy paths: Approval-Service → trust-api/approval-signer-2026-q4;
  testagent-transform → trust-api/agent-testagent-transform-2026-q4.
- Denies: registry mismatch, wrong key_ref for role, missing /
  bad workload token, bad Pocket-ID token, kid rotation.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-25 19:42:40 +00:00

28 lines
806 B
Go

// Package policy decides whether a given subject (= agent / client identity
// from the Pocket ID token) may sign a given key_ref. The in-prod backend is
// OPA; the dev-mode backend is AllowAll. OPA wiring is a follow-up subtask.
package policy
import (
"context"
)
// Decision carries both the boolean verdict and (on deny) a human-readable
// reason that the HTTP layer surfaces in the error response.
type Decision struct {
Allow bool
Reason string
}
// Decider abstracts the policy backend.
type Decider interface {
Allow(ctx context.Context, subject, keyRef string) (Decision, error)
}
// AllowAll permits everything. Dev / CI only. Logs loudly in main.
type AllowAll struct{}
func (AllowAll) Allow(_ context.Context, _, _ string) (Decision, error) {
return Decision{Allow: true}, nil
}